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Abstract—Location-aware smartphones support various location-based services (LBSs): users query the LBS server and learn
on the fly about their surroundings. However, such queries give away private information, enabling the LBS to track users. We
address this problem by proposing a user-collaborative privacy-preserving approach for LBSs. Our solution does not require
changing the LBS server architecture and does not assume third party servers; yet, it significantly improves users’ location
privacy. The gain stems from the collaboration of mobile devices: they keep their context information in a buffer and pass it to
others seeking such information. Thus, a user remains hidden from the server, unless all the collaborative peers in the vicinity lack
the sought information. We evaluate our scheme against the Bayesian localization attacks that allow for strong adversaries who
can incorporate prior knowledge in their attacks. We develop a novel epidemic model to capture the, possibly time-dependent,
dynamics of information propagation among users. Used in the Bayesian inference framework, this model helps analyze the
effects of various parameters, such as users’ querying rates and the lifetime of context information, on users’ location privacy.
The results show that our scheme hides a high fraction of location-based queries, thus significantly enhancing users’ location
privacy. Our simulations with real mobility traces corroborate our model-based findings. Finally, our implementation on mobile
platforms indicates that it is lightweight and the cost of collaboration is negligible.
Index Terms—Mobile Networks, Location-based Services, Location Privacy, Bayesian Inference Attacks, Epidemic Models
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smartphones, among other increasingly powerful mo-
bile computing devices, offer various methods of
localization. Integrated GPS receivers, or positioning
services based on nearby communication infrastruc-
ture (WiFi access points or base stations of cellu-
lar networks), enable users to position themselves
fairly accurately, which has led to a wide offering
of Location-based Services (LBSs). Such services can
be queried by users to provide real-time information
related to the current position and surroundings of the
device, e.g., contextual data about points of interest
such as petrol stations, or more dynamic information
such as traffic conditions. The value of LBSs is in their
ability to obtain on the fly up-to-date information.
Although LBSs are convenient, disclosing location
information can be dangerous. Each time an LBS
query is submitted, private information is revealed.
Users can be linked to their locations, and multiple
pieces of such information can be linked together.
They can then be profiled, which leads to unsolicited
targeted advertisements or price discrimination.
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Even worse, the habits, personal and private pref-
erences, religious beliefs, and political affiliations, for
example, can be inferred from a user’s whereabouts.
This could make her the target of blackmail or harass-
ment. Finally, real-time location disclosure leaves a
person vulnerable to absence disclosure attacks: learn-
ing that someone is away from home could enable
someone to break into her house or blackmail her [1].
An stalker can also exploit the location information.
All this information is collected by the LBS opera-
tors. So, they might be tempted to misuse their rich
data by, e.g., selling it to advertisers or to private
investigators. The mere existence of such valuable
data is an invitation to attackers, who could break
into the LBS servers and obtain logs of user queries, or
governments that want to detect and suppress dissi-
dent behavior. The result in all cases is the same: user-
sensitive data fall in the hands of untrusted parties.
The difficulty of the problem lies in protecting
privacy of users who also want to earn the benefits of
LBSs. Therefore, solutions such as not using LBSs are
not acceptable. For instance, a user could download
a large volume of data and then search through it for
specific context information as the need arises. But
this would be cumbersome, if not impractical, and
it would be inefficient for obtaining information that
changes dynamically over time.
The need to enhance privacy for LBS users is un-
derstood and several solutions have been proposed,
falling roughly into two main categories: centralized
and user-centric.
Centralized approaches introduce a third party in
the system, which protects users’ privacy by operating
between the user and the LBS. Such an intermediary
proxy server could anonymize (and obfuscate) queries
by removing any information that identifies the user
or her device. Alternatively, it could blend a user’s
query with those of other users, so that the LBS server
always sees a group of queries [2]. However, such
approaches only shift the problem: the threat of an
untrustworthy LBS server is addressed by the intro-
duction of a new third-party server. Why would the
new server be any more trustworthy? Additionally,
new proxy servers become as attractive for attackers
as centralized LBSs.
Other centralized approaches require the LBS to
change its operation by, for example, mandating that it
process modified queries (submitted in forms that are
different from actual user queries, possibly encrypted
using PIR [3]), or that it store data differently (e.g.,
encrypted or encoded, to allow private access [4]).
Centralized interventions or substantial changes to
the LBS operation would be hard to adopt, simply
because the LBS providers would have little incentive
to fundamentally change their operation. Indeed, if
a revenue stream is to be lost by user data not
being collected, then not many LBS providers can be
expected to comply. Misaligned incentives have been
identified as the root of many security problems [5].
User-centric approaches operate on the device. Typ-
ically they aim to blur the location information by,
for example, having the user’s smartphone submit
inaccurate, noisy GPS coordinates to the LBS server.
However, obfuscation approaches that protect user
location-privacy can degrade the user experience if
users need high privacy, e.g., LBS responses would
be inaccurate or untimely. Obfuscation also is not
effective against absence disclosure [6].
Our approach avoids the problems of these two
extremes by having users collaborate with each other
to jointly improve their privacy, without the need
for a trusted third-party (TTP). In effect, the mobile
crowd acts as a TTP, and the protection mechanism
becomes a distributed protocol among users. Mo-
bile users concerned about their location privacy are
indeed the most motivated to engage in protecting
themselves. We require no change in the LBS server
architecture and its normal operation, and we make
no assumption on the trustworthiness of the LBS or
any third-party server.
The key idea of our scheme, called MobiCrowd, is
that users only contact the LBS server if they cannot
find the sought information among their peers, i.e.,
other nearby reachable user devices. Hence, users can
minimize their location information leakage by hiding
in the crowd. Clearly, MobiCrowd would be most
effective when there are many peers gathered at the
same location. Indeed, this clustering phenomenon
has been observed in human mobility studies [7].
Moreover, the places where people gather are points
of interest, where users are most likely to query an
LBS. Thus, MobiCrowd would be used exactly where
it is most effective.
We evaluate MobiCrowd through both an epidemic-
based differential equation model and a Bayesian frame-
work for location inference attacks. The epidemic model
is a novel approach to evaluating a distributed
location-privacy protocol. It helps us analyze how the
parameters of our scheme, combined with a time-
dependent model of the users’ mobility, could cause
a high or low-degree privacy. We validate the model-
based results (on the probability of hiding a user
from the server) with simulations on real mobility
traces. We find that our epidemic model is a very
good approximation of the real protocol; it reflects the
precise hiding probability of a user.
Relying on hidden Markov models, the Bayesian
inference framework quantifies the correctness with
which an adversary can estimate the location of users
over time. The error of the adversary in this estimation
is exactly our privacy metric [8]. We evaluate Mobi-
Crowd on a real location-trace dataset and we show
that it provides a high level of privacy for users with
different mobility patterns, against an adversary with
varying background knowledge.
Note that this joint epidemic/Bayesian evaluation
is necessary and, in fact, a significant component of
our approach, as MobiCrowd is a distributed proto-
col running on multiple collaborating devices, so its
performance depends on network characteristics (e.g.,
time-dependent mobility), not just on what an indi-
vidual device does. The focus of the existing work in
the literature is more on privacy-preserving functions
(e.g., obfuscation functions run independently by each
user [9], [10]). To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first such evaluation, and it is significantly
more realistic than our own previous work [11] that
quantified privacy with just the fraction of queries
hidden from the server.
We implemented our scheme on Nokia N800, N810
and N900 mobile devices, and we demonstrated it
with the Maemo Mapper (a geographical mapping
software for points of interest) [12]. Our approach
can be used in the upcoming technologies that enable
mobile devices to directly communicate to each other
via (more energy-efficient) Wi-Fi-based technologies
[13], [14] that aim at constructing a mobile social
network between mobile users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
survey the related work in Section 2. In Section 3,
we describe our assumptions for the location-based
service, for mobile users and the adversary, and we
state our design objectives. We present MobiCrowd in
Section 4, and then we develop an epidemic model of
its operation in Section 5. We present our Bayesian
localization attacks in Section 6. We evaluate the
effectiveness of MobiCrowd in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
There are many collaborative schemes for mobile
networks. Mobile users, for example, can collectively
build a map of an area [15]. Collaboration is also
needed when sharing content or resources (e.g., In-
ternet access) with other mobile nodes [16].
Various threats associated with sharing location
information have been identified in the literature. For
example, users can be identified even if they share
their location sporadically [17]. Knowing the social
relations between users can help an adversary to
better de-anonymize their location traces [18]. Finally,
location sharing of a user not only diminishes her own
privacy, but also the privacy of others [19].
Techniques proposed to protect location privacy in
LBSs can be classified based on how they distort the
users’ queries before the queries reach the LBS server.
The queries can be anonymized (by removing users’
identities), pseudonymized (by replacing users’ real
names with temporal identifiers called pseudonyms),
or obfuscated (by generalizing or perturbing the spa-
tiotemporal information associated to the queries).
Queries can also be camouflaged by adding some
dummy queries, or be completely eliminated and hidden
from the LBS [10]. Combinations of these methods
have been employed in the existing (centralized or
distributed) mechanisms. We now discuss these ap-
proaches in more detail.
The mere anonymization of (especially the continu-
ous) queries does not protect users’ location privacy:
the queries of a user are correlated in space and time;
hence, the adversary can successfully link them to
each other, by using target-tracking algorithms [20], or
can successfully identify the real names of the users
[21]. Changing user pseudonyms while the users
pass through pre-defined spots, called mix zones [22],
makes it difficult to track the users along their trajec-
tories. However, users must remain silent inside the
mix zones, which means that they cannot use the LBS.
To mitigate this problem, the size of the mix zones is
kept small, which in turn limits the unlinkability of
users’ queries. Even if the mix zones are optimally
placed, the adversary’s success is relatively high [23].
Perturbing the query’s spatiotemporal content, in
addition to anonymization by a third party (central
anonymity server), has been proposed for obtaining a
higher level of privacy [2]. The main drawback is the
reliance on a centralized third party, which limits the
practicality of this proposal. The considerable degra-
dation of the quality of service imposed by obfusca-
tion methods is another deterrent for such solutions.
In [24], for example, the need to construct the cloaking
regions and to receive the responses from the server
through other users can considerably degrade the
service. Many obfuscation-based techniques are based
on k-anonymity, which has been shown inadequate to
protect privacy [8], [25]. Perturbation techniques with
differential privacy guarantee, however, have been
shown effective against an adversary with arbitrary
background knowledge [26].
Adding dummy queries to the user’s queries might
help to confuse the adversary about the real user loca-
tion. But generating effective dummy queries that di-
vert the adversary is a difficult task [27], as they need
to look like actual queries over space and time. An
optimum algorithm for generating dummy queries is
an open problem.
In all the above-mentioned mechanisms, there is
always a trade-off between users’ privacy and the
quality of service they experience [28]. The tension is
maximized when it comes to hiding queries from the
LBS server. Hiding a query from the server minimizes
the revealed user information and thus maximizes her
privacy with respect to that query. Simply put, it is
more effective than the other three privacy-protection
methods, and it protects users against both presence
and absence disclosure. This is what MobiCrowd
provides: It hides users from the server, yet allows
them to receive the query responses from other peers.
There exist cryptographic approaches that redesign
the LBS: the service operator does not learn much
about the users’ queries, though it can still reply to
their queries [4] or can obtain imprecise information
about user location [3]. The lack of incentives for LBS
operators to change their business model and imple-
ment these solutions, and their high computational
overhead, have made them impractical so far.
A game-theoretic evaluation of our protocol run by
rational users is presented in [29].
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.1 Mobile Users and LBS
We consider N users who move in an area split intoM
discrete regions/locations. The mobility of each user u
is a discrete-time Markov chain on the set of regions:
The probability that user u, currently in region ri, will
next visit region rj is denoted by pu(rj |ri). Let πu(ri)
be the probability that user u is in region ri.
Each user possesses a location-aware wireless de-
vice, capable of ad hoc device-to-device communica-
tion and of connecting to the wireless infrastructure
(e.g., cellular and Wi-Fi networks). As users move be-
tween regions, they leverage the infrastructure to sub-
mit local-search queries to an LBS, at some frequency
that we term LBS access frequency. The frequency at
which users query the LBS varies depending on the
type of requested information, on the dynamics of
information update in the LBS database, or on the
geographical region.
The information that the LBS provides expires pe-
riodically, in the sense that it is no longer valid. Note
that information expiration is not equivalent to the
user accessing the LBS: A user accesses the LBS when
her information has expired and she wishes to receive
the most up-to-date version of it.
In addition, the information the LBS provides is
self-verifiable, i.e., users can verify the integrity and
authenticity of the server responses. This can be done
in different ways; in our system, the user device
verifies a digital signature of the LBS on each reply
by using the LBS provider’s public key. As a result,
a compromised access point or mobile device cannot
degrade the experience of users by altering replies or
disseminating expired information.
3.2 Adversary Model and Privacy Metric
LBS servers concentrate location information from
all user queries. Thus, an untrusted service provider
could act as a “big brother,” that is, it could mon-
itor user whereabouts and activities over time. In
such a setting, the adversary can be categorized as
a passive global long-term observer [10]. We assume the
adversary has some background knowledge about the
users’ mobility patterns. This background knowledge
consists of each user’s mobility model, expressed as
a Markov chain, the users’ LBS access frequency, and
the information lifetime.
The adversary aims to perform inference attacks
against the locations of users. In other words, he uses
his background knowledge to estimate the locations
from which the users issue queries, but also the
locations they visit between successive queries that
are not directly disclosed to the LBS.
We quantify the location privacy of users as the
expected error of the adversary in estimating the
actual location of each user at each time instant [30].
The more queries the adversary observes, the more
successful he will be in reconstructing their actual
trajectories; so privacy is proportional to the distortion
of the reconstructed trajectories.
We do not address the threat of local observers
sniffing the wireless channel trying to infer users’
private information, as such a threat could exist with
or without MobiCrowd, and it can be alleviated by
frequently changing device identifiers (e.g., chang-
ing MAC addresses for WiFi networks [31] similar
to changing TMSI for GSM networks [32]). More
importantly, local observers, to be effective, would
need to be physically present next to any given victim
user, over long periods of time and across different
locations. In contrast, a centralized LBS can by default
observe all the queries of a user, which is why we
focus on this much greater threat in this paper.
Malicious users cannot mislead others into receiv-
ing fake information, because messages are digitally
signed by the LBS (as assumed in the previous sub-
section).
3.3 Design Objectives
Overall, our goal is to design a practical and highly
effective location-privacy preserving mechanism for
LBSs: We want to protect privacy with a minimal
compromise on LBS quality of service. The nature
of existing threats and the structure of stakeholder
incentives, outlined earlier, is the determining factor
of our design objectives.
Our first design objective is to not rely on archi-
tectural changes of the LBS; any such changes would
be impractical and highly unlikely to be adopted.
Relying on centralized trusted third parties (e.g., cen-
tral anonymity servers) to provide privacy enhancing
mechanisms can be as hard as having trusted LBS
operators. This leads to our second design objective:
no reliance on any third party server to provide privacy
protection. In fact, we would like to place the privacy
protection exactly where there is incentive and moti-
vation, that is, with the users themselves.
4 OUR SCHEME
Based on the stated design objectives, we propose
a novel location-privacy preserving mechanism for
LBSs. To take advantage of the high effectiveness of
hiding user queries from the server, which minimizes
the exposed information about the users’ location to
the server, we propose a mechanism in which a user
can hide in the mobile crowd while using the service.
The rationale behind our scheme is that users
who already have some location-specific information
(originally given by the service provider) can pass
it to other users who are seeking such information.
They can do so in a wireless peer-to-peer manner.
Simply put, information about a location can “re-
main” around the location it relates to and change
hands several times before it expires. Our proposed
collaborative scheme enables many users to get such
location-specific information from each other without
contacting the server, hence minimizing the disclosure
of their location information to the adversary.
4.1 Scheme Details
We build a mobile transparent proxy in each device that
maintains a buffer with location-specific information.
This buffer keeps the replies the user obtains from
the server or other peers. Each piece of information
associated with a given region has an expiration time
(which is attached to the information and protected
with the digital signature), after which the informa-
tion is no longer valid. Invalid information is removed
from the buffer.
Each user with valid information about a region is
termed informed user for that region. Users interested
in getting location-specific information about a region
are called information seekers of that region. A seeker,
essentially a user who does not have the sought
information in her buffer, first broadcasts her query
to her neighbors through the wireless ad hoc interface
of the device. We term this a local query.
Any of the receivers of such a local query might
respond to it, by what we term a local reply, as long
as it has the information its peer seeks. However,
an informed device will not necessarily respond to
any received query: this will happen if the device
is not only informed, but also willing to collaborate.
We design our system with this option for its users;
the collaborative status can be set explicitly by the
user or automatically recommended or set by the
device. Simply put, having each user collaborate a
limited number of times (a fraction of the times she
receives a local query from her neighbors), or during
a randomly selected fraction of time, balances the
cost of collaboration with the benefit of helping other
peers. In practice, this is equivalent to the case where
only a fraction of users collaborate.
By obtaining a local reply, the seeker is now in-
formed while, more importantly, her query has re-
mained hidden from the service provider. No privacy-
sensitive information has been exposed to the server
and the user has obtained the sought service. Of
course, in case there is no informed user around the
seeker willing to assist her, she has no choice but
to contact the server directly. In essence, a subset of
users in every region has to contact the LBS to get
the updated information, and the rest of the users
benefit from the peer-to-peer collaboration. Intuitively,
the higher the proportion of hidden user queries, the
higher her location privacy is.
5 EPIDEMIC MODEL FOR THE DYNAMICS OF
MOBICROWD
The performance of our system depends on various
parameters, such as the rate of contacts and the
level of collaboration between users, the rate of LBS
query generation, etc. We now describe a model for
MobiCrowd, with the help of which we can directly
evaluate the effect of various parameters on users’
location privacy. Observing the effect of the param-
eters also helps when designing a system and testing
“what-if” scenarios. For example, we can immediately
see the level of collaboration required to achieve a
desired privacy level or how the privacy level will
change if the users make queries more frequently or
less frequently.
We draw an analogy between our system and epi-
demic phenomena: location-context information spreads
like an infection from one user to another, depending
on the user state (seeking information, having valid
information, etc.). For example, a seeker becomes
“infected” when meeting an “infected” user, that is,
a user with valid information.
We want a model that describes transitions be-
tween, and keeps track of, the various states a user
is in as time progresses. However, it is prohibitively
complex to keep track of the state of each individ-
ual user. Therefore, we make use of the mean field
approximation [33], which focuses on the fraction of
users in each state; these fractions are collectively
called the network state. The approximation applies
when the number of users is large and each individual
interaction contributes a vanishingly small change
to the network state. The approximation requires a
random contact pattern among users, rather than a
spatially correlated pattern, and random contacts are
not far from reality when users are clustered in the
same region (recall that we partition the whole area
into regions).
The mean-field approximation tells us that the time
evolution of the fraction of users in each state can
be described with increasing accuracy, as the number
of users grows, by a system of Ordinary Differential
Equations (ODEs). By studying the system of ODEs,
we find the steady state(s) to which the network
converges. Similar models have been used in hu-
man virus epidemics [34], in worm propagation in
wireless networks [35], and in research on forward-
ing/gossiping protocols [36].
To keep the presentation simple, we focus on one
type of context information, hence we consider a sin-
gle average information lifetime. No loss of generality
results from this, because, to model a complete system
with multiple types of information, we can merge
multiple versions of this model, one for each type.
5.1 Model States and System of ODEs
As mentioned earlier, users move in an area par-
titioned into multiple regions. The state of context
knowledge within a region intuitively corresponds to
the disease status in an epidemic. In general, a user’s
knowledge state would be multi-dimensional, because
a different piece of information is relevant for each
region. Thus, for each region we would have an as-
sociated epidemic model, with the same structure but
different parameters. However, the state of knowledge
about a region is unrelated to the knowledge about
other regions, so different regions can be analyzed
separately. We present our model for a single region,
with users entering and exiting it; and we describe
the states and the dynamics of our epidemic model
for that single region.
The collective mobility of users with respect to
a region is modeled using three parameters: β, the
average number of times a user makes a proximity
contact with other users per time unit within a region;
µ, the probability of an outsider user entering a region
within a time unit; and λ, the probability of an insider
user leaving a region within a time unit. We derive
these parameters from the Markov mobility models
of users, as follows. Let parameters λi and µi be
the probabilities of exiting and entering region ri,
respectively. They correspond to the expected number
of users who exit/enter ri normalized by the expected
number of users who are inside/outside of ri.
λi =
∑
u,j 6=i πu(ri)pu(rj |ri)∑
u πu(ri)
(1)
µi =
∑
u,j 6=i πu(rj)pu(ri|rj)∑
u(1− πu(ri))
(2)
The contact rate βi between users in region ri corre-
sponds to the expected number of contacts of a device
within its communication range.
βi =
ni−1∑
k=0
k
(
ni − 1
k
)
qk(1 − q)ni−1−k (3)
where q is the fraction of region’s area that is within
the user’s communication range, and ni =
∑
u πu(ri)
is the expected number of users in region ri. Note
that the mobility parameters (λ, µ, and β) can also be
computed directly from sample location traces. The
list of all parameters of the epidemic model are listed
in Table 1.
Seeker: Users who are interested in obtaining infor-
mation (i.e., have requested the information but not yet
received it) are in the Seeker state. Once they have it,
they move into the Informed state. As long as a Seeker
user stays in the region that she seeks information
about, she is called an Insider Seeker. These users can
receive information from other Informed users in the
region, or from the server, the ultimate source of
information. A Seeker who leaves the region after
requesting information about that region is called an
Outsider Seeker. An Outsider Seeker can only receive
information from the server, as users need to be in
the same region in order to be able to propagate
information to each other.
Informed: Users who have information about the
region are in the Informed state. If they are inside the
region (called Insider Informed), they accept to spread
the information at each contact with a Seeker user
with probability φ. This is because the information
spreading process imposes some communication cost
on Informed users, hence they might not always
collaborate. If they are outside the region (called Out-
sider Informed), we assume they do not spread the
information. The information that the Informed users
have, whether they are inside or outside the region,
expires with rate δ and the users become Removed.
Removed: Users who do not have information and
are not currently interested in obtaining information are
in the Removed state. We distinguish between Insider
Removed and Outsider Removed users. An Insider
Removed user becomes a Seeker if the user becomes
interested in obtaining information about the region.
As LBS users usually query information about the
region they are in, we assume that outsiders have to
enter the region to become interested.
We denote by S(t), S∗(t), I(t), I∗(t), R(t), and R∗(t),
respectively, the fraction of Seeker Insider, Seeker Out-
sider, Informed Insider, Informed Outsider, Removed
S(t) insider Seeker users at time t
S∗(t) outsider Seeker users at time t
I(t) insider Informed users at time t
I∗(t) outsider Informed users at time t
R(t) insider Removed users at time t
R∗(t) outsider Removed users at time t
λ probability of exiting the region within a time unit
µ probability of entering the region within a time unit
β contact rate per user per time unit
γ avg request rate per user per time unit
1/ω avg waiting time before contacting the server
1/δ information avg lifetime
φ avg collaboration probability
TABLE 1
List of the symbols used in the epidemic model
Insider, and Removed Outsider users of a given region
at time t. The network state y(t) is the vector of
these values. The system of equations that models the
evolution of the network state is
S(t) + S∗(t) + I(t) + I∗(t) +R(t) +R∗(t) = 1 (4a)
d
dt
S(t) = µS∗(t)− (βφI(t) + ω + λ)S(t) + γR(t) (4b)
d
dt
S∗(t) = λS(t)− (ω + µ)S∗(t) (4c)
d
dt
I(t) = ωS(t) + (βφS(t)− δ − λ)I(t) + µI∗(t) (4d)
d
dt
I∗(t) = ωS∗(t) + λI(t)− (δ + µ)I∗(t) (4e)
d
dt
R(t) = δI(t)− (γ + λ)R(t) + µR∗(t) (4f)
d
dt
R∗(t) = δI∗(t) + λR(t)− µR∗(t) (4g)
0 ≤ S(t), S∗(t), I(t), I∗(t), R(t), R∗(t) ≤ 1. (4h)
5.1.1 Stationary Regime Analysis
We write system (4) succinctly as d
dt
y = F (y). We
study the stationary regime of the system, i.e., the
regime where, for t −→ ∞, the network state does
not change with time. In particular, we look for equi-
librium points, i.e., network states at which d
dt
y = 0.
Setting F (y) = 0 and solving for y, we reach the
following system of nonlinear equations.
S∗ = iS (5a)
I =
aS
bS + c
(5b)
I∗ = (
gS + e
bS + c
)S (5c)
R = (
−dgS + f
bS + c
+ h)S + d (5d)
R∗ = 1− (
g(1− d)S + a+ e+ f
bS + c
+ i+ h)S − d (5e)
jS2 + kS + cdγ = 0, (5f)
where
a = −ωµ(λ+ µ+ ω + δ)− δω2 (6a)
b = βφ(µ(δ + µ+ 1) + δω) (6b)
c = −δ(µ+ ω)(δ + λ+ µ) (6c)
d = µ(λ + µ+ γ)−1 (6d)
e = −ωλ(λ+ µ+ ω + δ) (6e)
f = ω(λ+ µ+ ω + δ)(λ + µ− δ)d (6f)
g = ωλβφ (6g)
h = −d(λ+ µ+ ω) (6h)
i = λ(ω + µ)−1 (6i)
j = (hb− dg)γ − a(βφ) − b(ω + λ− iµ) (6j)
k = (f + hc+ bd)γ − c(ω + λ− iµ) (6k)
Having expressed all variables in terms of S, we
need to solve the quadratic equation (5f) for S,
keeping in mind that any solution S0 has to satisfy
0 ≤ S0 ≤ 1. The value of S0 can be found from the
quadratic formula:
S0 =
1
2j
(
−k ±
√
k2 − 4jcdγ
)
(7)
Then, we substitute S0 into (5a)-(5e) to find the
other values S∗0 , I0, I
∗
0 , R0, R
∗
0.
So, we found the only admissible equilibrium point
of the network. We now give a sufficient condition
for this point to be locally asymptotically stable, that
is, all system trajectories starting near enough to the
equilibrium point will eventually converge to it with-
out wandering too far away in the meantime. This
condition is that the Jacobian matrix of the system,
evaluated at the equilibrium point, has eigenvalues
with strictly negative real parts. Note that, instead of
using the differential equation for R∗, we substitute
R∗ = 1−S−S∗−I−I∗−R and compute the Jacobian
of an equivalent system with only the 5 variables
S, S∗, I, I∗, R. The Jacobian J(S, I) is

−βφI − ω − λ µ −βφS 0 γ
λ −ω − µ 0 0 0
βφI + ω 0 βφS − δ − λ µ 0
0 ω λ −µ − δ 0
−µ −µ δ − µ −µ −γ − λ − µ


(8)
which, as we see, is only a function of S and I . The
eigenvalues of J(S, I) evaluated at the equilibrium
point can be found by solving the 5th order equation
|J(S0, I0)− xI5| = 0 (9)
for x, where I5 is the 5 × 5 unit matrix. As we
have mentioned, if all the solutions have a strictly
negative real part, then the equilibrium point is locally
asymptotically stable. Moreover, if all the solutions
have a strictly negative real part, the equilibrium
point persists under small perturbations of the system
parameters. That is, if v(y) is any smooth vector field
on R5, then for sufficiently small ǫ the equation
d
dt
y = F (y) + ǫv(y) (10)
has an equilibrium point near the original one, and
the equilibrium point of the perturbed system is also
locally asymptotically stable.
In Section 7, we show that all the eigenvalues have
a strictly negative real part for the range of system
parameters we consider; hence, the equilibrium point
is stable, and it persists under small perturbations of
the system parameters. The stability analysis justifies
using the equilibrium point to evaluate our system.
If it were unstable, then either the system would not
converge to it or the smallest disturbance would cause
the system to leave it.
5.1.2 Time-Dependent Mobility
So far, we have assumed that user mobility, expressed
through parameters µ, λ, and β, does not change
with time. But mobility is usually time-dependent
and periodic: users have different mobility patterns
in the morning than in the afternoon, but these pat-
terns repeat almost everyday. To address the time-
dependence of mobility, we can split time into time
periods and compute the mobility parameters for each
time period separately.
Making µ, λ, and β time-dependent in (4) means
that there is no longer an equilibrium point, because
the fraction of users in each state (e.g., Seeker, In-
formed, Removed) continuously changes over time.
We solve this system of nonlinear differential equa-
tions using numerical methods (as it is difficult to find
their closed-form solutions), which provide us with
the fraction of users at each time unit.
5.2 Baseline MobiCrowd: Buffer Only
To be able to isolate the effect of collaboration, we
study the case where there is no collaboration among
users and MobiCrowd relies only on its buffer to
protect users’ privacy: A user who becomes interested
checks her buffer, and if the content is not there, she
immediately contacts the server. Thus, there are no
Seeker (S and S∗) users in the model for this case:
I(t) + I∗(t) +R(t) +R∗(t) = 1 (11a)
d
dt
I(t) = γR(t) + µI∗(t)− (λ+ δ)I(t) (11b)
d
dt
I∗(t) = λI(t)− (µ+ δ)I∗(t) (11c)
d
dt
R(t) = δI(t) + µR∗(t)− (λ+ γ)R(t) (11d)
d
dt
R∗(t) = δI∗(t) + λR(t)− µR∗(t) (11e)
0 ≤ I(t), I∗(t), R(t), R∗(t) ≤ 1. (11f)
For the stationary regime analysis, we compute the
equilibrium point of the system, and study its stability
as before.
I∗ = zI (12a)
R = −
1
γ
(zµ− λ− δ)I (12b)
R∗ = 1− I
(
1−
1
γ
(zµ− λ− δ) + z
)
(12c)
I = µ
(
δ
γ
(λ+ γ + µ)(1 + z)− δ + µ(1 + z)
)−1
(12d)
where z = λ(µ + δ)−1.
To compute the stability of this point, we compute
the Jacobian for an equivalent system that arises after
substituting R∗ = 1 − I − I∗ − R. In this case the
system is linear, so if the eigenvalues are negative,
then the equilibrium point is globally asymptotically
stable, that is, the system converges to it for any initial
condition. The Jacobian is
J =

−λ− δ µ γλ −µ− δ 0
δ − µ −µ −µ− λ− γ.

 (13)
The equation to solve for the eigenvalues is, simi-
larly as before, |J−xI3| = 0. We will show the stability
of the equilibrium point in the next section.
For time-dependent mobility parameters, as before,
we analyze the system numerically.
6 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The direct objective of MobiCrowd is to hide user
queries from the server. We quantify this objective,
as our first evaluation metric, through the hiding
probability: the probability that a user’s query becomes
hidden from the server due to MobiCrowd proto-
col. Under various user mobility and information
spreading dynamics, we compute this metric using
the results of the time-dependent epidemic model,
and we compare to the results of simulations on a
dataset of real mobility traces. In Section 7, we show
that the simulation results corroborate our model-
based findings about the hiding probability.
As our second evaluation metric, we quantify the
location privacy that Mobicrowd offers to users against
localization attacks. Specifically, we compute the ex-
pected error of an adversary who observes a user’s
trace and then forms a probabilistic estimate of her
location. This probabilistic estimate is based on a
Bayesian location inference approach [30] that enables
us to incorporate both the background knowledge and
observation of the adversary and to precisely quantify
the location privacy of users. We link this Bayesian
inference to our epidemic model, by computing the
observation probability of the adversary from the
hiding probability of MobiCrowd.
6.1 Probability of Hiding in the Mobile Crowd
The hiding probability in a given region is estimated
as the fraction of queries per time unit that are not
observed by the server. The higher this fraction, the
lower the adversary’s success in performing inference
attacks on the observed queries. Hiding some of the
users’ locations from the adversary has two benefits:
(1) Users become less traceable over space and time, as
observed queries from a user are sparser, hence harder
to correlate with each other and easier to be confused
with the queries of other users [20], [37], [8]; and (2)
the set of a user’s observed queries becomes harder
to link to the user’s real name. The hiding probability
can show the reduction in the amount of information
the adversary obtains from the users’ queries compared
to the case where users directly contact the server for
each query.
In the case of no collaboration among users, i.e.,
in buffer-only MobiCrowd, the users can retrieve the
information either from their buffer or from the server.
Only the I users have the information in their buffers,
whereas the R users are forced to contact the server
when they become interested. The I users ask queries
at a total rate of γI , and the R users at a total rate of
γR. Therefore, the hiding probability in this case is
HP0 =
I
I +R
(14)
where I and R are computed from (11).
In the case of collaboration with probability φ > 0
among users, queries can also be answered by peers.
Only an insider user who is not already a Seeker,
i.e., Insider Informed and Insider Removed users, can
send a new query. So, we focus only on them and
we compute the hiding probability as the probability
that the user’s query, given that she is an Insider
Informed/Removed, is answered by buffer or a peer.
The user is Insider Informed with probability I
I+R
.
By definition, the query of an Insider Informed user
is immediately answered by the buffer. So, her hiding
probability is 1.
Turning to Insider Removed users, the probability
of being Insider Removed is R
I+R
. By definition, such
a user (who, right after sending the query, becomes an
Insider Seeker) needs to wait for an Insider Informed
peer to collaborate with her. If she cannot find one
before her waiting time expires, she has to expose her
location to the server. Either of the two that happens
first can be modeled as a competition between two
exponential random processes: P with mean 1/βφI ,
representing the time to get the response from peers,
and S with mean 1/ω, representing the time to get the
response from the server. Then, the hiding probability
is the probability that process P wins:
Pr{P < S} =
∫ ∞
−∞
fS(s)ds
∫
S−P>0
fP (p)dp =
=
βφI
βφI + ω
(15)
So, finally, we compute the hiding probability as
HPφ =
I
I +R
+
R
I +R
·
βφI
βφI + ω
(16)
where I and R are computed from (4). We can see
that if we set the collaboration probability φ to zero,
the hiding probability becomes equal to (14).
6.2 Location Privacy versus Inference Attacks
In a localization attack the adversary targets a specific
user at a specific time instant and computes the
probability distribution over the regions where the
user might be [38]. This distribution is computed
given the observed traces from the user. Formally, the
adversary computes Pr{Atu = r|ou} for user u at time
instant t for all regions r, where Atu is the random
variable for the actual location of user u at time t,
and ou is the observed trace from user u. In the case of
MobiCrowd users, the (server’s) observation at a time
t is either null or the true location of the user. From the
adversary’s localization probability distribution, we
quantify the location privacy of a user as the probability
of error of the adversary in guessing the user’s true location,
averaged over all times t.
We use Bayes’ rule to compute the localization
probability for the adversary.
Pr{Atu = r|ou} =
Pr{Atu = r,ou}
Pr{ou}
(17)
=
Pr{Atu = r,o
1:t
u }Pr{o
t+1:T
u |A
t
u = r}
Pr{ou}
where T is the length of the observed trace; note
also that we use the conditional independence of
o
t+1:T
u and o
1:t
u given A
t
u = r. The probabilities in
the numerator can be computed recursively using
the forward-backward algorithm of Hidden Markov
Models (HMM). The normalizing factor Pr{ou} can
also be computed simply by summing the numerator
over all regions r [30].
To compute (17) we need, according to the theory
of HMM, two quantities: (1) the transition probability
between regions (i.e., pu(rj |ri), mobility model of
the user), and (2) the observation probability (i.e.,
Pr{Otu|A
t
u = r}, the probability of each possible
observation, given the true location of the user). We
compute the observation probability from the Mobi-
Crowd hiding probability (16) as
Pr{Otu = o|A
t
u = r} =


1− γ(1−HPφ) o = null
γ(1−HPφ) o = r
0 o.w.
(18)
Having specified the transition and observation prob-
abilities, we run the forward-backward algorithm (for
hidden Markov models) to compute the localization
probabilities for each time t. We then compute their
average value over all time units t to compute the
location privacy of users of our privacy-preserving
scheme for various system parameters.
7 EVALUATION
The location traces that we use belong to 509
randomly chosen mobile users (vehicles) from the
epfl/mobility dataset at CRAWDAD [39]. We set the
time unit of the simulation to 5 minutes and we
consider the users’ locations at integer multiples of
the time unit, thus synchronizing all the traces. We
group time units into three equal-size time periods:
morning, afternoon, evening. We divide the Bay Area
into 10× 25 equal-size regions. Two users in a region
are considered to be neighbors of each other if they are
within 100m of each other (using WiFi). We run our
simulation for 100 times on the traces and compute
the average of the results.
From the location traces, we construct the time-
dependent mobility model of each individual user,
in the format of transition probability matrices (one
matrix per time period). We also compute the average
mobility model, which reflects how the whole crowd
moves. For each region and time period we compute
the mobility parameters λ, µ, and β separately (see
Section 5).
We set the average waiting time before contacting
the server, 1/ω, to 1; in effect, choosing it as the unit
by which the information lifetime and the request
rate will be measured. We evaluate the system for all
combinations of collaboration level φ = {0.5, 1}, in-
formation lifetime 1/δ = {1, 4, 10, 16, 22}, and request
rate γ = {0.05, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. Information lifetimes
lower than 1, i.e., shorter than the waiting time, do not
make much sense. If information expires fast, the user
cannot be willing to wait a long time before getting it,
as it would be stale by the time it is received. Similarly,
request rates larger than one imply multiple requests
per time unit. But this cannot be compatible with the
user’s willingness to wait for one time unit.
7.1 Validation of Epidemic Model
In order to validate our model, we compare our
numerical computation of hiding probability with
simulation results.
The mobility parameters β, λ, µ and the ranges of
system parameters γ, δ, φ are plugged into the epi-
demic model of MobiCrowd in order to compute
numerically the solutions of (4) and (11) as functions
of time. In other words, we compute the fraction of
users in each state for each time unit. Note that this
is different from just computing the stationary regime
solutions. We then compute the hiding probability
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Fig. 1. Users’ hiding probability, due to MobiCrowd, for
the region under study (in downtown San Francisco).
The first row illustrates the hiding probability of users
when there is no collaboration, i.e., when users have
to contact the server if they do not find the sought
information in their buffer. The second and third rows
show the same metric for collaboration factors φ = 0.5
and φ = 1, respectively. The left column shows the
numerical results obtained from the epidemic model,
whereas the right column shows the difference be-
tween the model and the simulation results.
as a function of time from (14) and (16). Finally,
we simulate the MobiCrowd protocol on the location
traces, and for each region and each time unit, we
compute the users’ hiding probability using directly
its definition as the fraction of queries hidden from the
LBS server. We plot the results obtained in Figure 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the average users’ hiding prob-
ability using MobiCrowd with and without collab-
oration (PGφ and PG0). As it is not possible to
plot the results for all the regions, we compute a
representative example: the hiding probability in one
region, located in downtown San Francisco. It has a
higher concentration of points of interest, and 90 users
are present in it on average, with a contact rate of
β = 51.89 per user per time unit. The results of the
numerical evaluation are displayed side by side with
their absolute difference with the simulation results.
This enables us to verify the validity of our epidemic
model. The qualitative and also quantitative match
between the simulation and the model enables us to
rely on our epidemic model to evaluate users’ location
privacy in a very computationally efficient way in
complex scenarios dealing with large networks.
All the plots confirm a general pattern of increasing
hiding probability as the information lifetime or the
request rate increases. With either kind of increase,
users retrieve with a higher probability non-expired
information, either from their own buffer or from
their peers; hence, a higher fraction of their queries
will be hidden from the LBS. Moreover, the hiding
probability of each query for long lifetimes and low
request rate values (i.e., long intervals between re-
quests) appears to be more or less the same as the
hiding probability for short lifetimes and high request
rate values (i.e., short intervals between requests), as
indicated by the vaulted shape of the contours. Also,
adding collaboration to the buffering technique in
MobiCrowd increases the fraction of hidden queries
even for a collaboration factor of φ = 0.5.
7.2 Evaluation of Privacy
We use the Location-Privacy Meter tool [8] to quantify
the location privacy of users as the expected error
of the adversary in guessing their correct location,
including at times when they do not issue a query, i.e.,
between two successive LBS queries. We are interested
in analyzing the privacy effect of the following factors:
• The adversary’s background knowledge on user
mobility, which can be
– the mobility model of each individual user
(Individuals’ Mobility Model), or
– the average mobility model of the whole user
population (Average Mobility Model).
• The adversary’s method of attack, which can
consist of
– just observing exposed locations, i.e., not try-
ing to guess a user’s locations between two
queries (Observation adversary), or
– perpetrating Bayesian localization attacks to
infer the whole location trace of each user
(Inference adversary).
We compute privacy for multiple combinations of
these factors, with and without our protection proto-
col. The concrete scenarios we study are:
• Baseline: Inference without observations
• No Protection vs. Observation/Inference
• MobiCrowd vs. Observation/Inference
In the Baseline scenario, we compute privacy against
the inference attack, assuming that the adversary
ignores his LBS observations and relies only on his
background knowledge. This scenario quantifies the
extent to which the adversary’s knowledge is by itself
sufficient to predict the users’ locations over time. It
is a baseline scenario, in the sense that no privacy
mechanism can achieve better privacy than this.
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(a) Adversary’s Background Knowledge: Individuals’ Mobility
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(b) Adversary’s Background Knowledge: Average Mobility
Fig. 2. Average Location Privacy of MobiCrowd users against the Bayesian inference localization attack (top row
of each sub-figure), and the %-improvement that MobiCrowd achieves over no protection, when MobiCrowd is
not in place (bottom row of each sub-figure). The considered adversary’s background knowledge is the set of
mobility models of all individual users, in Sub-Fig. (a), and the average mobility model of all users, in Sub-Fig. (b).
In the No Protection scenario, users submit their
queries directly and immediately to the server with-
out using any protection mechanism. This scenario
reflects the risk of unprotected use of LBSs. We com-
pute privacy against the observation and against the
inference adversaries.
In the MobiCrowd scenarios, we again compute pri-
vacy against the observation/inference adversaries.
However, in this case, users make use of MobiCrowd,
hence their observed traces contain fewer locations
than in the no protection scenario.
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Fig. 3. Cumulative Fraction of users’ location privacy in different protection/attack scenarios. Users’ collaboration
level is 0.5, the request rate is 0.4, and the information lifetime is 10. The graphs show what fraction of users (on
the y-axis) have a privacy level up to a certain point (on the x-axis). Sub-figures (a) and (b) differ in terms of
the background knowledge of the adversary (used in the Bayesian inference attack). The Baseline (infr) graph
shows their location privacy against the Bayesian inference attack, if the adversary relies only on his background
knowledge. The No Protection (infr) graph shows users’ location privacy against the Bayesian inference attack, if
they do not use any protection mechanism and submit their queries to the server. The No Protection (obs) graph
shows location privacy of users in terms of the fraction of times their true location is not exposed to the server,
because they didn’t have any query. The MobiCrowd (infr) shows location privacy of MobiCrowd users against
the Bayesian inference attack. The MobiCrowd (obs) shows location privacy of MobiCrowd users in terms of the
fraction of times their true location is not exposed to the server, due to the protection or lack of a query.
7.2.1 Average Location Privacy
To see how our system performs across a range of pa-
rameters, we compute, for all combinations of system
parameters (request rate γ, information lifetime 1/δ,
and collaboration probability φ), the average location
privacy of users against the localization attack, as
explained in Section 6.2, for the MobiCrowd and No
Protection scenarios.
Figure 2 shows the location privacy of MobiCrowd
users against the localization attack, as well as the
%-improvement of their privacy over having no pro-
tection (i.e., when they send all their queries to the
server). Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) illustrate the re-
sults for the cases where the adversary’s knowledge
is the mobility model of all individual users and their
average mobility model, respectively. Thus, the com-
parison between Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) shows
the effect of the adversary’s background knowledge
on the users’ location privacy.
MobiCrowd achieves the best %-improvement in
the high (> 0.6) request rate regime, especially if the
information lifetime is not too low. If the request rate
is low, few locations are exposed in the first place, so
location privacy is already high even without protec-
tion. Privacy is in danger at high request rates, where
MobiCrowd’s improvement is significant: It ranges
from 2x (100%) up to 6.5x (550%). This observation
holds true across all twelve cases in Figure 2.
As expected, the adversary does considerably better
when using each user’s own mobility model in the
attack, rather than using the average mobility model
for everyone. More precisely, the success probability
of our Bayesian inference attack, in estimating a user’s
location between two successive observations, signif-
icantly increases if we provide the adversary with a
more precise mobility model. However, we see that
here again MobiCrowd helps when it is most needed,
and significantly improves (up to 550%) the users’
location privacy when the adversary is very powerful
due to his accurate background knowledge.
Finally, note that, although more collaboration is
definitely better, full collaboration φ = 1 is not nec-
essary to reap the benefits of MobiCrowd. Even at
φ = 0.5 there is a considerable privacy gain.
The only cases where MobiCrowd’s improvement
is below 100% is when privacy is already high, in
which case a further increase does not really matter,
or when information expires too fast, in which case
the users are forced to contact the server for most of
their queries.
7.2.2 Cumulative Distribution of Location Privacy
In order to better analyze the added value of the
adversary’s knowledge and his inference attack on the
one hand, and the effectiveness of MobiCrowd on the
other hand, we compute users’ location privacy for all
the scenarios we enumerated in Section 7.2, but only
for a single set of parameters (γ = 0.4, δ = 0.1, and
φ = 0.5). We plot the results in Figure 3, which shows
the cumulative distributions of users’ location privacy in
different scenarios. Plotting cumulative distributions
allows us to observe Mobicrowd’s improvements for
all desirable percentiles of users, instead of being
limited to the previously computed averages over all
users.
The baseline privacy in Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b)
shows how much information is embedded in the
background knowledge of the adversary, i.e., how
accurately he can predict users’ locations, relying only
on their mobility models.
In each of the sub-figures, the Baseline (inference)
and No Protection (inference) scenarios reflect the risk
of using location-based services without any protec-
tion. Even an adversary with knowledge of the aver-
age mobility can significantly decrease users’ location
privacy, hence the extreme need to employ privacy
enhancing protocols such as MobiCrowd.
The difference, approximately 35%, between loca-
tion privacy in MobiCrowd (observation) and No
Protection (observation) shows the added value of
MobiCrowd with respect to an observer (e.g., a curi-
ous but not adversarial LBS operator). However, these
privacy values do not constitute a lower bound on
user privacy, as an inference adversary can estimate
the actual location of users more accurately.
We can see the additional damage caused by an
inference adversary, compared to an observer, by com-
paring corresponding (observation) and (inference)
scenarios. There is a difference of about 3x for the
Individuals’ Mobility Model, and a much smaller one,
15-30%, for the Average Mobility Model. This is to
be expected, as the quality of the inference depends
heavily on the quality of the background knowledge.
The added value of MobiCrowd against an infer-
ence adversary is about 50%, when the adversary’s
knowledge is Individual Mobility Model, and a bit
less than 50% when the knowledge is Average.
7.3 Implementation
We implement MobiCrowd on three different Nokia
mobile devices (N800, N810, and N900) by building
a mobile privacy proxy in each device. The proxy does
not require any modification of the supported appli-
cations and it is transparent to their operation. The
prototype works with the Maemo Mapper LBS and
MobiCrowd acts as an HTTP transparent proxy to
which the client traffic is redirected. Note that know-
ing the format of the LBS queries and the data format
of the server replies is enough to adapt MobiCrowd to
new LBS applications. Our implementation in Python
is 600 lines of code, including the proxy module,
ad-hoc networking module, and the server interface
module. Memory utilization does not exceed 3% of
the total device memory.
We perform measurements on a 5-device testbed
to estimate the delay for obtaining a peer response.
Three out of the five are randomly chosen to collab-
orate each time. Mobiles access the LBS server over
a cellular link (e.g., GSM) and communicate with
each other via the WiFi interface. Averaged over 100
queries, the delay is 0.17sec. We also note that crypto-
graphic delays are (for a typical OpenSSL distribution)
low: the weakest of the three devices, the N800, can
verify more than 460 RSA signatures per second (1024
bit), or 130 signature verification per second (for 2048
bit modulus); this implies that the digitally signed
LBS responses can be easily handled by the devices
to protect against malicious peers.
A popular technique that enhances privacy against
local eavesdroppers is to change identifiers frequently.
Cellular network operators make use of network-issued
pseudonyms (TMSIs) to protect the location-privacy of
their users [32]. MobiCrowd-ready mobile devices can
also mimic this defense (as has already been proposed
for wireless networks, e.g., [31]). They can change
their identifiers (e.g., the MAC addresses) as often as
desired, even while in a single point-of-interest area.
This would essentially root out any threat by any
curious local observer. Even in the case of a stalker, it
would not be possible to link together the successive
identifiers of a device, as multiple users’ identifiers
will be mixed together. The only remaining option
for the stalker is to maintain visual contact with the
target user, but defending against this threat is clearly
orthogonal to our problem.
8 CONCLUSION
We have proposed a novel approach to enhance the
privacy of LBS users, to be used against service
providers who could extract information from their
LBS queries and misuse it. We have developed and
evaluated MobiCrowd, a scheme that enables LBS
users to hide in the crowd and to reduce their ex-
posure while they continue to receive the location
context information they need. MobiCrowd achieves
this by relying on the collaboration between users,
who have the incentive and the capability to safe-
guard their privacy. We have proposed a novel an-
alytical framework to quantify location privacy of
our distributed protocol. Our epidemic model cap-
tures the hiding probability for user locations, i.e.,
the fraction of times when, due to MobiCrowd, the
adversary does not observe user queries. By relying
on this model, our Bayesian inference attack estimates
the location of users when they hide. Our extensive
joint epidemic/Bayesian analysis shows a significant
improvement thanks to MobiCrowd, across both the
individual and the average mobility prior knowledge
scenarios for the adversary. We have demonstrated the
resource efficiency of MobiCrowd by implementing it
in portable devices.
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